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Abstract—Cooperative jamming as a physical layer security
enhancement has recently drawn considerable attention. While
most existing works focus on communication systems with a
small number of nodes, we investigate the use of cooperative
jamming for providing secrecy in large-scale decentralized net-
works consisting of randomly distributed legitimate users and
eavesdroppers. A modified slotted ALOHA protocol, named CJ-
ALOHA, is considered where each legitimate transmitter either
sends its message signal or acts as a helping jammer according
to a message transmission probability p. We derive the secrecy
transmission capacity to characterize the network throughput
and show how the throughput is affected by the CJ-ALOHA
protocol. Both analytical and numerical insights are provided on
the design of the CJ-ALOHA protocol for optimal throughput
performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Guaranteeing security in wireless networks is a fundamental
challenge due to the broadcast nature of the communication
medium. The commonly used encryption-based approaches
rely on high computational complexity to provide secrecy
without exploiting the properties of the wireless channels.
On the other hand, the notion of physical layer security was
developed from information-theoretic studies where “perfect”
secrecy can be achieved by properly designing the encoder-
decoder pair according to the channel capacities [1, 2]. Many
recent works have been devoted to new physical layer security
enhancements using advanced wireless technologies.
This paper focuses on one important physical layer security
enhancement named cooperative jamming [3]: The secrecy
of communication between the legitimate transmitter-receiver
pair is improved by having external helper(s) simultaneously
send independent signals to confuse the eavesdropper. The
authors in [4, 5] studied the case of a single helper who can
increase the secrecy capacity or achievable secrecy rate of
the legitimate link by sending codewords independent of the
transmitted messages. When the wireless channels are affected
by small-scale fading, the availability of the channel state
information (CSI) must be taken into account in designing the
helper’s strategy. The authors in [6] designed various strategies
of the helping jammer based on different CSI assumptions and
showed their impact on the secrecy performance. The case of
multiple helping jammers was considered in [7–9], where the
jammers transmit noise signals in a cooperative manner to
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maximize the achievable secrecy rate. Moreover, the helpers
may also come from the internal users of the communication
system. For example, the users having poor channel conditions
in a multiple access scenario can transmit jamming signals
instead of their message signals to improve the secrecy rates
of the users with better channels [10].
While most of the works on cooperative jamming consid-
ered systems with a small number of nodes, very few studies
have been carried out for large-scale networks. Unlike point-
to-point communications where it is often easy to exchange
secret keys which enables encrypted transmissions, security
is more expensive and difficult to achieve in large-scale
decentralized networks. Hence, the study of physical layer
security becomes important in such networks. In this work,
we study networks having both legitimate and eavesdropper
nodes whose locations follow independent homogeneous Pois-
son point processes (PPPs) and consider a slotted ALOHA
protocol with cooperative jamming (CJ-ALOHA). Specifically,
each potential transmitter is allowed to transmit the message
signal with probability p. Whenever the message transmission
is not allowed, the transmitter acts as a helping jammer instead
and emits a noise signal.
The recent work in [11] developed a notion of secrecy
transmission capacity to characterize the secrecy throughput
of large-scale networks with Poisson distributed nodes. A
major assumption in [11] was that eavesdroppers do not have
any successive decoding capability and hence treat concurrent
message transmissions as noise. From an information-theoretic
viewpoint, this assumption is often too optimistic. In this work,
we consider a worst-case scenario where eavesdroppers do
have successive decoding capability. The CJ-ALOHA protocol
is hence introduced to provide secrecy, since the random jam-
ming signals cannot be resolved by the eavesdroppers. The CJ-
ALOHA protocol can be easily implemented in decentralized
wireless networks, as no inter-node coordination or location
knowledge is required. We use the secrecy transmission ca-
pacity to characterize the network throughput. A closed-form
expression of the secrecy transmission capacity is derived,
which allows us to numerically optimize the design parameters
of the CJ-ALOHA protocol, i.e., the message transmission
probability p and the ratio of the jamming power to the
message transmission power. In the case where the power for
jamming and message transmission is fixed to the same level,
we also derive an analytical result on the optimal transmission
probability that maximizes the secrecy transmission capacity.
The works in [12, 13] are relevant to ours in the way
that cooperative jamming was studied in large-scale networks
with Poisson distributed nodes. In [12], the jammers and
eavesdroppers are distributed according to independent PPPs,
whereas only a single legitimate transmitter-receiver pair is
considered. In contrast, we allow message transmissions to
take place between all the transmitter-receiver pairs and study
the network throughput taking interference into account. The
authors in [13] considered the transmissions between all the
node pairs and derived secrecy capacity scaling laws, i.e., the
order-of-growth of the secrecy capacity as the number of
nodes increases. In comparison, we provide a finer view of
the network throughput to better understand the impacts of
system parameters and transmission protocols, since most
such design choices affect the throughput but not the scaling
behaviors [14].
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an ad hoc network having both legitimate
and eavesdropper nodes over a large two-dimensional area.
We model the locations of all legitimate transmitters as a
homogeneous PPP Φl with density λl. This is a suitable model
for decentralized networks with nodes having substantial mo-
bility [15]. The network employs a slotted ALOHA protocol,
that is, each transmitter is allowed to actually transmit the
message signal with probability p in each time slot. Hence,
the locations of the actual transmitters in any time slot follow
a homogeneous PPP ΦT with density pλl. Each transmitter has
an intended receiver at a distance r in a random direction1.
In addition, the locations of the eavesdroppers are also drawn
according to another homogeneous PPP Φe with density λe.
Note that the eavesdroppers need to have similar mobility
and other behaviors as the legitimate nodes since they can be
easily identified otherwise [16]. Furthermore, we assume that
the eavesdroppers do not collude and, hence, must decode the
messages individually.
In this work, we modify the slotted ALOHA protocol to
include cooperative jamming: In each time slot, the legitimate
transmitters at Φl are classified into actual transmitters and
helping jammers, whose locations are denoted as ΦT and ΦJ ,
respectively, with ΦT
⋃
ΦJ = Φl. Note that ΦJ is also a
homogeneous PPP with density (1 − p)λl. The nodes at ΦJ
transmit jamming signals in order to improve the secrecy of
the message transmissions from nodes at ΦT . We call this
protocol CJ-ALOHA. When the transmit power is allowed to
vary, we denote the power for message transmission as PT
and the power for jamming as PJ , which are the same for all
transmitters.
The signal propagation through the wireless medium is
affected by the large-scale path loss as well as the small-
scale fading. In this work, we consider a path loss exponent
of α > 2 and Rayleigh fading channels. The instantaneous
CSI is known at the receiver side (including the legitimate
1A discussion on variable distance transmission can be found in [11].
receivers and the eavesdroppers) but not at the transmitter
side. Thermal noise is assumed to be negligible as compared
to the aggregate jamming noise at the receiver side. Hence,
the detection performance is characterized by the signal-to-
interference ratio (SIR).
A. Secrecy Transmission Capacity
The notion of secrecy transmission capacity was developed
in [11], which characterizes the area spectral efficiency of
secure communication in decentralized wireless networks. The
well-known Wyner’s encoding scheme was assumed in deriv-
ing the secrecy transmission capacity. Specifically, the Wyner
code requires the transmitter to choose two rates, namely, the
codeword rate Rt and the secrecy data rate Rs, with the rate
redundancy Re = Rt − Rs representing the cost of securing
the message against eavesdropping. Detailed descriptions of
Wyner’s encoding scheme can be found in [1, 17, 18]. For any
given Rt and Rs, the following outage events can result from
any transmission [11, 18]:
• Connection Outage: The capacity of the channel from
the transmitter to the intended receiver is below the
codeword rate Rt. Hence, the message cannot be correctly
decoded by the intended receiver. The probability of this
event happening is referred to as the connection outage
probability, denoted as Pco.
• Secrecy Outage: The capacity of the channel from the
transmitter to one or more eavesdroppers is above Re.
Hence, the message is not perfectly secure against eaves-
dropping. The probability of this event happening is
referred to as the secrecy outage probability, denoted
as Pso.
The connection outage probability can be regarded as the
communication quality of service (QoS) while the secrecy
outage probability gives a measure of the security level.
Formally, the secrecy transmission capacity is defined as the
achievable rate of successful transmission of confidential mes-
sages per unit area, with a given connection outage probability
Pco = σ and a given secrecy outage probability Pso =  [11]:
τ = Rs(1− σ)pλl, (1)
where (1 − σ)pλl is the density of successful message trans-
missions. The secrecy data rate Rs = [Rt − Re]+, where
[a]+ = max{0, a}, is a function of both σ and . Specifically,
σ determines Rt and  determines Re. Whenever Rt −Re is
negative, message transmission needs to be suspended.
III. SECRECY TRANSMISSION CAPACITY WITH
COOPERATIVE JAMMING
In this section, we derive analytical results on the secrecy
transmission capacity for networks using the CJ-ALOHA pro-
tocol. Our analysis conditions on having a typical transmitter-
receiver pair at some specific locations. From Slivnyak’s
Theorem [19], the conditional distributions of all other node
locations are the same as the original (unconditional) ones.
Consider the message transmission from the typical trans-
mitter, we assume that the typical receiver, located at the ori-
gin, treats the interference from all other nodes in Φl as noise.
Hence, a connection outage occurs if log2(1 + SIR0) < Rt,
where SIR0 denotes the SIR at the typical receiver given by
SIR0 =
PTS0r
−α
PT
∑
x∈ΦT
Sx‖x‖−α + PJ
∑
y∈ΦJ
Sy‖y‖−α
, (2)
where S0 and r are the channel fading gain and the distance
between the typical transmitter and receiver, respectively, Sx
(Sy) and ‖x‖ (‖y‖) are the channel fading gain and the
distance between the interferer at x (y) and the typical receiver,
respectively. The fading gains are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) exponential random variables with unit
mean.
Define a threshold SIR value for connection outage as
βt = 2
Rt − 1. (3)
Hence, the connection outage probability can be written as
Pco = P
(
SIR0 < βt
)
= P
(
PTS0r
−α
PT
∑
x∈ΦT
Sx‖x‖−α+PJ
∑
y∈ΦJ
Sy‖y‖−α
< βt
)
,
(4)
where P(.) denotes the probability measure.
Lemma 1: The connection outage probability is given by
Pco = 1− exp
[
−λlpir
2β
2/α
t Γ
(
1−
2
α
)
Γ
(
1 +
2
α
)
ν1
]
. (5)
where ν1 = p+ (1− p)(PJ/PT )2/α.
Proof: The probability in the same form as in (4) often
appears in the literature of stochastic geometry. The derivation
can be obtained, for example, by following the proof of
Lemma 2 in [20]. The key step is using the fact that the
interference term in (2) is the sum of two independent shot
noise processes in two-dimensional space and their Laplace
transforms are known in closed forms [21]. We omit the
derivation here for brevity. 
With the connection outage constraint given by Pco = σ,
the codeword rate Rt can be found using (3) and (5) as
Rt = log2

1 +
[
ln 11−σ
λlpir2Γ
(
1− 2α
)
Γ
(
1 + 2α
)
ν1
]α
2

 . (6)
Apart from the intended receiver that is listening to the mes-
sage transmission, all the eavesdroppers also try to intercept
the message at the same time. We consider the worst case
scenario where only the jamming signals from ΦJ are not
resolvable and hence treated as noise by the eavesdroppers.
For the message transmission from the typical transmitter at
the origin2, the message is not perfectly secure against the
2Here we shift the coordinates so that the typical transmitter is located at
the origin. This does not change the distributions of Φl and Φe.
eavesdropper at z in Φe if log2(1+SIRz) > Re, where SIRz
denotes the SIR at z given by
SIRz =
PTSz‖z‖
−α
PJ
∑
y∈ΦJ
Syz‖y − z‖−α
, (7)
where Sz and ‖z‖ are the channel fading gain and the
distance between the typical transmitter and eavesdropper at
z, respectively, Syz and ‖y − z‖ are the channel fading gain
and the distance between the jammer at y and eavesdropper at
z, respectively. Again, the fading gains are i.i.d. exponential
random variables with unit mean.
Define a threshold SIR value for secrecy outage as
βe = 2
Re − 1. (8)
Let A = {x ∈ Φe : SIRx > βe} be the set of eavesdroppers
that can cause a secrecy outage. Define an indicator function
1A(z), which equals 1 when the eavesdropper at z is in the set
A. The secrecy outage probability equals the probability that
at least one of the eavesdroppers in Φe belongs to A, which
can be written as
Pso = 1− EΦJ
{
EΦe
{
ES
{ ∏
z∈Φe
(
1− 1A(z)
)}}}
,
= 1− EΦJ
{
EΦe
{
∏
z∈Φe
(
1−P
( PTSz‖z‖−α
PJ
∑
y∈ΦJ
Syz‖y−z‖−α
> βe
∣∣∣z,ΦJ)
)}}
,
(9)
where E{.} denotes the expectation operator. The indepen-
dence in the fading gains is used to move the expectation
over S = {Sz, Syz} inside the product over Φe in (9). Since
a closed-form expression of Pso seems intractable, we resort
to an analytical upper bound given in the following lemma:
Lemma 2: The secrecy outage probability is bounded from
above by
PUBso = 1− exp

− λe
λlβ
2/α
e Γ
(
1− 2α
)
Γ
(
1 + 2α
)
ν2

 , (10)
where ν2 = (1− p)(PJ/PT )2/α.
Proof: The derivation follows the proof of Lemma 1 in [11]
and hence is omitted for brevity. 
From [11] we know that the bounding technique used
to derive the upper bound in (10) gives a very accurate
approximation of the exact secrecy outage probability in (9).
With the secrecy outage constraint given by Pso = , the rate
redundancy Re can be found with high accuracy using (8) and
(10) as
Re = log2
(
1+
[λl
λe
Γ
(
1−
2
α
)
Γ
(
1+
2
α
)
ν2 ln
1
1−
]−α
2
)
. (11)
Having Rt in (6) and Re in (11), we compute the rate of
confidential messages as Rs = [Rt−Re]+. Hence, the secrecy
transmission capacity is readily obtained.
Theorem 1: The secrecy transmission capacity with a con-
nection outage constraint of σ and a secrecy outage constraint
of  is given by
τ = (1− σ)pλl
·

log2

 1 +
[
ln 1
1−σ
λlpir2Γ(1−
2
α
)Γ(1+ 2
α
)ν1
]α
2
1+
[
λl
λe
Γ
(
1− 2α
)
Γ
(
1+ 2α
)
ν2 ln
1
1−
]−α
2




+
,
(12)
where ν1 = p + (1 − p)(PJ/PT )2/α and ν2 = (1 −
p)(PJ/PT )
2/α
.
Strictly speaking, the expression in (12) is a lower bound
on the secrecy transmission capacity. Nevertheless, this lower
bound gives an accurate approximation of the exact value
due to the fact that the upper bound on the secrecy outage
probability in (10) is a very accurate approximation of the
exact value [11]. Therefore, we for simplicity refer to τ in
(12) as the secrecy transmission capacity.
A. Condition for Positive Secrecy Transmission Capacity
Clearly, the secrecy transmission capacity is zero when the
expression inside [·]+ in (12) is non-positive. In this case, mes-
sage transmission is not allowed since the connection and/or
secrecy outage constraint(s) cannot be satisfied otherwise.
Therefore, it is important to determine the condition under
which a positive secrecy transmission capacity is achieved.
Corollary 1: For a connection outage constraint of σ and
a secrecy outage constraint of , the secrecy transmission
capacity given in (12) is positive when
ln
1
1− σ
ln
1
1− 
> pir2λe
[
1 +
p
1− p
(
PT
PJ
) 2
α
]
. (13)
Remark: This condition depends on the densities of the
actual transmitters and helping jammers only through their
ratio p/(1−p). If the condition in (13) does not hold, changing
the number of legitimate users in the network does not help in
obtaining a positive secrecy transmission capacity if the users
do not reduce their message transmission probability p.
B. Optimizing the CJ-ALOHA Protocol
The effect of cooperative jamming on the secrecy transmis-
sion capacity can be described using two parameters, namely,
the message transmission probability p and the normalized
jamming power PJ/PT (i.e., normalized by the power of
message transmission). With the closed-form expression of the
secrecy transmission capacity derived in (12), one can easily
carry out numerical search to obtain the optimal values of p
and PJ/PT . Note that the individual values of PJ and PT
should satisfy any given power constraints.
In what follows, we consider the important special case
where the nodes only transmit with fixed power, i.e.,PJ = PT ,
and present an analytical result on the optimal message trans-
mission probability.
Corollary 2: In the case of fixed power transmission, the
optimal message transmission probability for networks in the
high security regime (i.e., with  very close to 0) is given by
p∗ = 1−
1
W0
(
exp(1)κ
) , (14)
where W0(·) is the real-valued principal branch of the Lam-
bert W function and
κ =
λl
λe
Γ
(
1−
2
α
)
Γ
(
1+
2
α
)
ln
1
1− 
·

1 +

 ln 11−σ
λlpir2Γ
(
1− 2α
)
Γ
(
1+ 2α
)


α
2


2
α
. (15)
Proof: See Appendix. 
Remark: Using the fact that the Lambert W function W0(z)
is increasing in z ∈ (0,∞), we obtain the following results:
1) p∗ reduces as the density of eavesdroppers λe increases.
2) p∗ increases as the density of legitimate transmitters λl
increases. 3) p∗ reduces as the connection outage constraint
gets tighter (i.e., as σ decreases). The first result is intuitive
since a higher jamming noise level is needed to fight against
an increasing number of eavesdroppers. The last two results
are less intuitive. Here we only give a rough explanation for
the last result: With fixed power transmission, the connection
outage probability Pco in (5) and the codeword rate Rt in
(6) are independent of p. Hence, a decrease in σ results
in a reduction in Rt regardless how p changes. In order to
maximize the secrecy transmission capacity, it is desirable to
reduce Re in (11). Since Re does not depend on σ, we need to
decrease p in order to make Re smaller, which explains why
p∗ decreases as σ decreases.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present numerical results to illustrate
how the CJ-ALOHA protocol affects the secrecy transmission
capacity.
Fig. 1 shows the secrecy transmission capacity τ over a
wide range of the message transmission probability p. The
normalized jamming power PJ/PT is fixed to a constant value
for each curve. We see that a poor throughput performance
often occurs when p is either too small or too large. A
small p can result in inefficient spatial reuse, which directly
affects the area spectral efficiency. On the other hand, a
large p may cause an insufficient amount of jamming noise
against eavesdropping, in which case the data rate needs
to be reduced to meet the target secrecy constraint. The
benefit of optimizing the message transmission probability is
usually significant. For example, in the case of fixed power
transmission (PJ = PT ), the maximum secrecy transmission
capacity is 0.0057 achieved at p = 0.42, whereas the secrecy
transmission capacity reduces to 0.004 (i.e., a 30% reduction)
if we reduce p to 0.21 (i.e., p is halved). Comparing across
the three curves with different normalized jamming power,
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Fig. 1. The secrecy transmission capacity τ in (12) versus the message
transmission probability p. Results are shown for networks with different
normalized jamming power, i.e.,PJ/PT = 10 dB, 5 dB and 0 dB (i.e.,PJ =
PT ). The other system parameters are r = 1, α = 4, σ = 0.3,  = 0.03,
λl = 0.01, and λe = 0.001.
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Fig. 2. The optimal normalized jamming power PJ/PT versus the
secrecy outage probability . Results are shown for networks with different
message transmission probability, i.e., p = 0.7, 0.5, and 0.3. The other system
parameters are r = 1, α = 4, σ = 0.3, λl = 0.01, and λe = 0.001.
we see that choosing appropriate power levels can also give a
significant throughput improvement.
Fig. 2 shows the optimal ratio of the jamming power to
the message transmission power for networks with different
security requirements. The message transmission probability
p is fixed to a constant value for each curve. As the security
requirement increases (from right to left in the figure), it is
desirable to increase the normalized jamming power to reduce
the SIRs at the eavesdroppers, which in turn minimizes the
data rate reduction needed to meet a higher secrecy constraint.
For networks with high security requirements, e.g.,  = 0.01,
the optimal normalized jamming power is shown to reach
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Fig. 3. The optimal message transmission probability p versus the secrecy
outage probability . Results are shown for networks with different normalized
jamming power, i.e., the numerically optimized PJ/PT , PJ/PT = 10 dB,
and PJ/PT = 0 dB (i.e.,PJ = PT ). For the case of numerically optimized
PJ/PT , we limit the dynamic range of the transmit power to be 20 dB. We
also plot the analytical expression of the optimal p given in (14) for the case
of PJ = PT . The other system parameters are r = 1, α = 4, σ = 0.3,
λl = 0.01, and λe = 0.001.
20 dB or higher. Such a large difference between the jamming
power and the message transmission power may not be prac-
tical due to the transmitter’s limited dynamic range as well as
issues with fast switching between high and low power levels.
Comparing across the three curves with different message
transmission probabilities, we see that a lower normalized
jamming power is needed if p is smaller, since there are more
jammers available in the network.
Fig. 3 shows the optimal message transmission probability
for networks with different security requirements. When the
normalized jamming power is also optimized3, we see that the
network can enjoy a moderately high probability of message
transmission, even if the security requirement is as high as
 = 0.01. In practice, however, the transmitting nodes may
not have such a degree of freedom in fast varying their
transmit power. Hence, we also plot the optimal message
transmission probability for the case of fixed power trans-
mission (PJ = PT ). Specifically, the solid line shows the
optimal p obtained by a numerical search, while the dashed
line shows the analytical result obtained in (14). We see that
the analytical result is accurate for networks with relatively
high security requirements, e.g.,  < 0.05. Compared with the
case of optimized power levels, the optimal value of p in fixed
power transmission is significantly lower, due to the need for
a larger number of jammers to produce a satisfactory amount
of jamming noise.
3In this figure, we limit the dynamic range of the transmit power to be 20
dB. Hence, the optimal PJ/PT is numerically found within the range from
-20 dB to 20 dB.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, cooperative jamming as a physical layer
security technique was studied in the context of large-scale
decentralized wireless networks. Its impact on the network
throughput was characterized using the secrecy transmis-
sion capacity. Our numerical results showed that significant
throughput improvements can be obtained by properly design-
ing the parameters of the CJ-ALOHA protocol.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
With PJ = PT , the secrecy transmission capacity reduces
to
τ = (1 − σ)pλl
·

log2

 1 +
[
ln 1
1−σ
λlpir2Γ(1−
2
α
)Γ(1+ 2
α
)
]α
2
1+
[
λl
λe
(1−p)Γ
(
1− 2α
)
Γ
(
1+ 2α
)
ln 11−
]−α
2




+
.
Now we assume that the condition for positive secrecy trans-
mission capacity in (13) holds and focus on the high security
regime where  is very small. As → 0, τ can be approximated
as
τ ≈ (1− σ)pλl
· log2

 1 +
[
ln 1
1−σ
λlpir2Γ(1−
2
α
)Γ(1+ 2
α
)
]α
2
[
λl
λe
(1−p)Γ
(
1− 2α
)
Γ
(
1+ 2α
)
ln 11−
]−α
2

 ,
= (1− σ)λl
α
2 ln 2
p ln
(
(1− p)κ
)
,
where κ is given in (15). Hence, the optimal message trans-
mission probability is
argmax
p
f(p), where f(p) = p ln
(
(1 − p)κ
)
.
The first and second derivatives of f(p) w.r.t. p are computed
as
df(p)
dp
= 1 + lnκ− ln
1
1− p
−
1
1− p
,
d2f(p)
dp2
= −
1
1− p
−
1
(1 − p)2
.
Since the second derivative is negative for p ∈ (0, 1), f(p)
is concave in p. The optimal p is obtained by letting the first
derivative equal to zero, i.e.,
ln z + z = 1 + lnκ, where z = 1
1− p∗
.
The value of z that satisfies the above equality is given by the
Wright ω function as [22]
z = ω(1 + lnκ),
which can also be expressed in terms of the Lambert W
function as [22]
z = W0
(
exp(1 + lnκ)
)
.
Note that the principal branch of the Lambert W function
is used due to the fact that κ > 1 when the condition for
positive secrecy transmission capacity in (13) holds. Using the
definition that z = 11−p∗ , the value of p
∗ is readily obtained.
